Conformance
How to read a requirement
Requirement pages in this section use the keywords from RFC 2119. MUST and MUST NOT are obligations: an implementation that does not satisfy one is not an implementation of this protocol, whatever else it does correctly. SHOULD and SHOULD NOT are strong recommendations — deviating is a decision that needs a stated reason, not a default. MAY marks a choice the specification is genuinely indifferent to.
Every requirement carries an identifier prefixed by the page that defines
it — MODEL-n, OP-n, INV-n, PRED-n, MSG-n — and identifiers are
stable and append-only. A requirement, once numbered, keeps that number
for as long as the specification exists, because someone else's grant,
verifier, or audit note may already cite it; renumbering to keep a page
tidy would silently invalidate every citation written against the old
number. A requirement that is later withdrawn is marked withdrawn in
place, not deleted and not reassigned to something else.
What conformance means
An implementation conforms to this specification when it satisfies every MUST in it. That is the entire test — SHOULD and MAY do not enter into whether an implementation conforms, only into whether it is well-advised.
Today, conformance is demonstrated by argument: by reading a requirement against the source that is supposed to satisfy it, and by the test suites that exercise that source. There is no conformance suite that runs against an implementation independently of reading its code — nothing that takes an arbitrary binary and reports pass or fail against this specification. Describing one as forthcoming would be a claim about a plan, not about the protocol, so this page does not make it.
The annex
This implementation is the only one that exists, and it does not fully meet the specification these reference pages describe. Where it falls short, that gap belongs here rather than left for a reader to discover by comparing pages against source.
| Requirement | Status |
|---|---|
INV-3 bounded fan-in | Not met. MAX_FANIN = 16 exists for a batched fold circuit that is not built. foldAggregate folds one source per call and nothing counts calls per principal, so fan-in is unbounded in-circuit; depth is the only structural limit enforced. |
INV-10 predicates append-only | Met by process, not by any runtime check. There is no verifier-key registry on-chain to check a change against. |
| Binding scheme 2 | Reserved, unimplemented. Only self-asserted binding exists, which proves key control and nothing more — not that the holder is a person, a company, or the operator of a given agent. |
| Predicate registry | One entry: income_at_least. |
| Enforceable entitlement | Partly met. Contract custody and pull-only withdrawal make entitlement enforceable — value stays where rules can reach it. Nothing yet enforces it: entitlementBps is recorded and conserved by createComposition, but no circuit moves value according to it, and a vault position is created only by depositShielded crediting its own caller. |
MODEL-10, MODEL-11 commitment hiding | Not met. recordIncome publishes claimNonce into the usedClaimNonces set, and the same value is the commitment randomness for both incomeCommitment and commitAggregate in contracts/parts/income.compact. recipientId is public as the aggregates key. The remaining preimage unknowns — amount, occurredAt, tier — are low-entropy, and after a first accrual an aggregate's total equals that amount, so both commitments can be opened by search. MODEL-13 states the unpredictability requirement that a vault position's nonce does meet; these two commitments do not meet it. |
INV-5 no double-counting per edge | Not met. foldAggregate in contracts/parts/entitlement.compact takes periodStart and periodEnd as caller parameters, folds them into the nullifier, and writes them into the resulting aggregate without checking either against the source's or the principal's own period. The same edge folded under two different period labels produces two distinct nullifiers and counts the source twice, without bound. An aggregate's period bounds are therefore caller-asserted, which discloseIncomeAtLeast presents to a verifier as assurance. |
MODEL-9, MODEL-10 income commitment fields | Not met in full. incomeCommitment in contracts/parts/income.compact hashes only recipientId, amount, occurredAt, tier, and claimNonce. currency and issuerKeyId are carried in the signed message and checked by recordIncome at claim time, but neither is bound into the log entry's own commitment: an aggregate cannot distinguish currencies, and the attesting issuer is not recoverable from a log entry. |
Keeping this table current is a review obligation on any change that touches the consensus surface — the six items CONTRIBUTING.md asks for an issue about before any code is written, not something to send as a pull request and discuss afterward. This page does not restate that list: a second copy here would drift from it exactly the way an implementation drifts from a specification, and duplicating it buys nothing a pointer doesn't. A conformance claim that has quietly stopped being true is worse than no claim at all: a reader who trusts a stale "met" has no way to know they should have checked further.